The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 68

Number 1

February 2001

Physicians Ought Not Kill
Jack Healy,

Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq

Recommended Citation
Healy,, Jack (2001) "Physicians Ought Not Kill," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 68: No. 1, Article 1.
Available at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol68/iss1/1

Article 1

Physicians Ought Not Kill
by

1

Fr. Jack Healy, O.Carm

1

The author is Ex-Officio Board Member and Chaplain, St. Luke's
Medical Association. He presented the following paper to the Annual
Meeting of the Catholic Medical Association in 1999. The reader is
reminded of the recent change in the legal situation in the
Netherlands since that time.

Dying well or experiencing death with dignity and ease is the root
understanding of the Greek word euthanasia. A pious Catholic could
invoke the help ofSt. Joseph for such a death. But in the twentieth century,
dying well has become a serious problem owing ironically and in no small
part to the medically advanced and highly technologized treatment we have
devised. To many sick and terminal patients, not only their illness but the
prospect of such treatment is overwhelming and frightening. Facing their
mortality has led some of them to propose suicide as a form of dying well,
specifically, physician-assisted suicide. The proposal and, in the state of
Oregon, the actual practice have stirred moral and public policy debates as
the literature amply attests.' While this paper treats of some of those
debates, its primary concern is the vital distinction between killing and
letting die. The distinction all too easily escapes popular notice but
nonetheless determines the debate about physician-assisted suicide and
euthanasia.
Doctors and health care workers need no reminding about the mixed
results which the union of medicine and technology has had in patient care.
"The same technology which extends the life of one person may simply
prolong the dying of another.,,2 In cases where partial or full recovery is in
doubt, images of sedated or comatose patients tethered to machines raise
the question whether such treatment is worth it after all. The Quinlan case
in 1976 and the Cruzan case in 1988, and a succession of cases between
4
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them - Saikewicz [1977], Spring [1980] , Eichner [1981], Barber [1983],
Bartling [1984] , Conroy [1985], Brophy [1986], and Jobes [1987] served to instruct the public on its legal and moral right to decide for or
against life-sustaining treatment including the use of ventilations, cardiopUlmonary resuscitation, dialysis and tube-feedings.
Recognition of the right culminated at the federal level with the
Patient Self-Determination Act (PSAD) which went into effect December,
3
1991. The PSAD obligates every health care facility receiving Medicare
or Medicaid funding to inform its clients of their right to decline unwanted
medical treatments, even those that prolong life. On the local level states
also recognize that right, which has found articulation in so-called
"advanced directives'" "durable power of attorney", and "living wills."
As vehicles meant to enhance patient autonomy, advanced directives,
living wills, etc., can be morally legitimated insofar as they accord with a
principle which has informed Catholic medical ethics since the sixteenth
century. That is, for the preservation of life, no one is obligated to choose
extraordinary means where the benefits are disproportionate to the risk and
burden incurred.
The 1980 Vatican Declaration on Euthanasia reiterated that principle
and appealed to its sister principle, namely, the distinction between killing
and letting die. While letting die is permitted, killing is not and stands
condemned by the fifth commandment forbidding the intentional killing of
an innocent life "whether a fetus or an embryo, an infant or an adult, an old
person, or one suffering from an incurable disease or a person who is
dying.,,4
While some moralists contend that between killing and letting die
there is no real difference/ the distinction has nevertheless been useful at
the level of common sense and practicality. Doctors generally recognize in
their intention and action a difference between terminating futile treatment
for a dying patient and terminating the patient by lethal injection.
The distinction between killing and letting die has until recently been
crucial in maintaining the wall between death that is moral and legal and
death that is not. Today that wall has been breached. The shaky consensus
reached in society since Quinlan and Cruzan stands challenged by recent
initiatives advocating direct interventions to bring about a patient's death
either with assistance (so-called assisted suicide) or by the direct action of
another (so-called active euthanasia).
Killing Events

We are all aware of the dramatic events that have so shaped public
consciousness that, as a result, it now views end-of-life killing as
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"compassionate killing", "death with dignity" and "managed dying". Four
events easily come to mind, each of them eroding moral restraints on
suicide and euthanasia.
Heading the list is Jack Kevorkian's lethal crusade to assist the
suicides of what initially were terminal patients battling insufferable pain.
He has since widened his dragnet to include the chronically ill, those with
degenerative diseases, those with poor medical prognoses and, in one case,
a woman afflicted with obesity and chronic fatigue syndrome. Until his
much-publicized commission of an act of direct euthanasia6 Kevorkian has
assisted with legal impunity in the suicides of at least fifty individuals.
In 1991 Kevorkian articulated the goals of his crusade by publishing a
book, the title of which speaks for itself: Prescription: Medicide - The
Goodness of Planned Death (Prometheus Books). In that book and in a
subsequent article, he advances assisted suicide and euthanasia "as an
honorable medical service" which he laments has suffered a reversal in the
course of western history. As to the culprit responsible for this reversal,
Kevorkian is emphatic: "arbitrary laws to foist rules of conduct dictated by
religion.,,7 In campaigning to end those laws, Kevorkian finds preposterous
whatever moral restraint the distinction between killing and letting die
provides.
Another event played out in medical journals and books has been the
open advocacy of doctors for assisted suicide. In 1989 the much respected
New England Journal of Medicine featured from leading medical centers
across the United States ten of twelve physicians who endorsed physicianassisted suicide. Going beyond support for terminating futile medical
treatment, these doctors stated, " All but two of us ... believe in the rational
suicide of a terminally ill patient."g
More shocking was the anonymous piece entitled "It's Over, Debbie" ,
appearing in 1988 in the Journal of the American Medical Association. A
resident gynecologist confesses to euthanizing a twenty-year-old patient
dying of ovarian cancer. He relates:
It was a gallows scene, a cruel mockery of her youthful and unfulfilled
potential. Her only words to me were, "Let's get this over with."
I retreated with my thoughts to the nurses's station .. . I asked the
nurse to draw 20 mg. of morphine sulphate into the syringe. Enough, I
thOUght to do the job ...
Debbie looked at the syringe, then laid her head on the pillow
with her eyes open, watching what was left of the world. I injected the
morphine intravenously.. . With clocklike certainty, within four
minutes the breathing rate slowed even more, then became irregular,
then ceased ... It's over, Debbie.9

6
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Eschewing anonymity, Dr. Timothy Quill of the University of
Rochester (NY) confesses in a 1991 issue of the New England Journal of
Medicine to assisting his patient "Diane" in suicide. lo Whereas the actions
of Kevorkian and the anonymous resident provoked outcries and
disapproval, Quill's action g~nerally did not. His participation in a
patient's suicide was lauded because of the comprehensive medical care
and deep concern he accorded her. I I
Incidentally, Quill alleges in his book Death and Dignity: Making
Choices and Taking Charge that
Survey data that are flawed by low response rates and poor design
suggest that from 3 to 37 percent of anonymously responding
physicians admitted secretly taking active steps to hasten a patient's
death. 12

Before moving on to the third event which has undermined the moral
prohibition against suicide and euthanasia, we must mention another
pUblication, Derek Humphrey's suicide manual entitled Final Exit.13 This
how-to book was the cover story of Newsweek (26 Aug., 1991) and within
weeks of publication made the New York Times best seller list.
A third event, which needs no lengthy commentary, is the 1994
Oregon ballot initiative which resulted in the state's "Death with Dignity
Act." In 1995 the act became statute, allowing physicians under certain
specified conditions to prescribe lethal drugs but not administer them. In a
classic case of having it both ways, "The bill somewhat oddly stipulates
that a death brought about in accordance with its measure 'shall not
constitute suicide, assisted suicide, mercy killing or homicide' (Measure
16, 1994).,,14
We may note in passing that five years ago, Oregon was "the first
state in the nation to ration care for the poor based on a scale of costeffectiveness. [And] Beginning this month [January, 1999], Oregon has
added assisted suicide to its list of funded services.,,15
In line with the Oregon provision allowing physician-assisted suicide,
fifteen other state legislatures saw bills introduced between 1995-96 to
allow so-called "aid-in-dying." In 1996, two federal courts, one in
Washington state, the other in New York, proclaimed physician-assisted
suicide as a constitutionally protected right. The Washington case was
filled by the euthanasia organization "Compassion in Dying" and the New
York case by Dr. Timothy Quill. 80th cases, [Washington v. Gluckberg
and Vacco v. Quil/], having made their way to the Supreme Court, invoked
the Fourteenth Amendment to challenge the states' criminal ban on
physician-assisted suicide. In a much-touted decision, the Supreme Court
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on June 26, 1997 saw no amendment violations on the part of the states
banning physician-assisted suicide. 16
The legal aspects of these cases lie, of course, outside the competency
of this paper. But it bears noting that the Court' s finding against a
constitutional right or liberty interest in "choosing the time and manner of
one' s death" in no way precludes the states from decriminalizing physicianassisted suicide or euthanasia. The point is understood by any American
aware that the practice in Oregon remains unaffected by the Supreme Court
decision.
Finally, we cite one last event which has served to undermine the
check that morality has provided against suicide and euthanasia. We refer
to the liberal policy of euthanasia in the Netherlands. While as of this
writing not yet formally legalized, physician-assisted suicide and
euthanasia have in practice existed there for over two decades. Of the
30,000 doctors in the Netherlands, 25,000 are members of the Royal Dutch
Medical Association (RDMA) which subscribes to euthanasia and
physician-assisted suicide, activities the Association regards as
indistinguishable. If the opinion polls be accurate, in 1966, 40 percent of
the Dutch population favored euthanasia, but by 1988, 81 percent.
With the concurrence of the Dutch courts the RDMA has drawn up
guidelines for "permissible" euthanasia. With these as criteria, the Dutch
Attorney General in 1990 chaired a commission which conducted three
separate studies of physicians involved in hastening a patient's death. Of
the 129,000 deaths per year in the Netherlands, 2,700 are directly caused or
assisted by a physician. In addition to those deaths, the Commission
reported 1,000 nonvoluntary deaths, that is, those occurring without an
explicit and persistent request of the patient. Euthanized deaths, thetefore
accounted for nearly 3 percent of the total number in the Netherlands. We
may add, incidentally, that with full universal health care there, physicians
have no financial incentive for terminating their patient' s Iife. 17
We have cited Kevorkian, certain medical publications, the Oregon
statute and the Netherlands as events which impinge on the American
consciousness. What, we may ask, has been their practical effect? It may
come as no surprise that

1

1

1

In polls of public opinion, a clear majority of Americans report that
they favor making it legal for physicians to prescribe or administer
lethal drugs to dying patients who want a quick and painless end to
life. IS
Most Americans, whether subscribing to that opinion or not,
recognize that such practices affect us morally and socially at some
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fundamental level. Doctors in particular sense that the ethic of medicine is
once again at stake as it was in the Supreme Court decision regarding
abortion.

Killing and Letting Die
When it came before the House Judiciary, the American Medical
Association cited its "Code of Medical Ethics,,19 and reiterated its
opposition to physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. At the same time
over sixty amicus curiae pro and con were being filed at the Supreme Court
relative to Washington v. Gluckberg and Vacco v. Quill. Testifying before
the Judiciary, the president of the AMA cited as ethically cogent the
distinction between killing and letting die, the distinction which the
Supreme Court in its subsequent decision accepted as a basis for upholding
the Washington and New York State laws.
The AMA noted the opposing view, which argues that since death is
the result whether through killing or letting die, "the acts themselves carry
equal moral status." The AMA disagreed, criticizing this view for failing
to recognize that
Withholding or withdrawing treatment allows death to proceed
naturally, with the underlying disease being the cause of death.
Assisted suicide, on the other hand, requires action to cause death,
independent from the disease process.20
In maintaining the distinction, the AMA could have bolstered its
argument by introducing as morally relevant the principle governing the use
of ordinary and extraordinary means. The distinction justifies the right of a
person to refuse to initiate or to continue medical intervention once the
treatment, in light of circumstances, is deemed "extraordinary" because of
its risk, cost and burden. Perhaps, this was the allusion the AMA was
making when, undoubtedly aware of Cruzan, Quinlan et alii, it mentioned
"principles that underlie the right of patients to refuse the continuation of
medical care.,,21
However, neither the principle of ordinary vs. extraordinary means
nor that of killing vs. letting die informs the so-called Philosophers' Brief
One of the sixty amici curiae, this document is, as its authors point out, a
first of its kind. While in the past, philosophers have been party to
litigation before the Supreme Court, the Philosophers' Brief represents the
first time that general moral philosophers have intervened solely and in
their own name. 22
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Written by six of our nation ' s luminaries in the field of ethics, the
In
Philosophers' Brief is an appeal for physician-assisted suicide.
constructing its case, the Brief ignores the ordinary/extraordinary
distinction and dismisses as philosophically naIve the distinction between
killing and letting die. In fact, the overall argument of the Brief relies on
the denial of the distinction .
Attempting to give an ethical rationale to the challenges before the
Supreme Court, the Brief interweaves moral argument with past legal
cases. Of the many cases it cites in the interest of removing the
Washington and New York ban on physician-assisted suicide, Cruzan v.
Missouri and Planned Parenthood v. Casey figure prominently in the Brief.
With reference to Cruzan, the philosophers infer that implicit in the
Court' s recognition of a patient's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is
"the more profound right" the patient enjoys for determining the timing and
manner of hislher death. In the reasoning of the Brief, the patient' s choice
or right to die renders irrelevant any moral distinction between killing and
letting die. In light of Cruzan and this "profound right" the philosophers
conclude with regard to physician involvement that

)

I

If it is permissible for a doctor deliberately to withdraw medical
treatment in order to allow death to result from a natural process, then it
is equally permissible for him to help his patient hasten his own death
more actively, if that is the patient's express wish. 23

The permissibility which the Brief claims for"6 doctor to assist his
patient's suicide ignores one of the essential elements for determining a
moral act, namely, intention. Overlooked is the fact that while the
physicality of the act may be the same, e.g., the removal of a feeding tube
from a terminal cancer patient, the doctor' s intention may be either the
patient's death through starvation or the patient's comfort by ceasing
useless treatment. Even the muscular athlete senses a difference in his
game when his intention to block a tackle becomes the intention to harm
the tackler. In the language of traditional morality, there is a difference in
moral object: one an act of sport, the other an act of battery.
Besides ignoring intention, the Brief not uncommonly elides the
question that certain results may be foreseen into the conclusion that they
are necessarily chosen. But foreseen results are not necessarily those that
are chosen. That a doctor foresees death hastened through increased
morphine does not mean that in administering the dosages he chooses the
patient's death.
It is hard to account for the obfuscations and lapses of logic found in
the Brief. Moreover, we may even wonder if the philosophers truly helped

10
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their cause by favoring in their argument the case of Planned Parenthood v.
Casey . In this 1992 decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the essential
holding of Roe v. Wade. As we know, the Court articulated what has come
to be called the "mystery passage." In limiting the ability of states to
proscribe abortion, the Court claimed a sphere of autonomy wherein
individuals experience that
,...

at the heart of liberty is the right to define one' s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not defme the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State?4

Whether viewed as a statement of extreme subjectivism or muddled
metaphysics, this mystery passage from Casey was one of the arguments
which the Supreme Court heard in the Washington case. Quoting the
passage twice verbatim, the philosophers merely accepted it as moral
legitimation for patient autonomy that includes suicide.
There is much to criticize in the Philosophers' Brief.25 Its failure to
be philosophically persuasive is reflected in the fact that not a single
26
opinion of the Court praises or criticizes the Brief. It is simply not cited.
Yet for purposes of this paper, the Brief serves to reveal the two key
philosophical assumptions which have thus far justified events like
Kevorkian, physician advocacy of suicide, and euthanasia in Oregon and
the Netherlands. That is, physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia require,
on the one hand, the denial of a distinction between killing and letting die,
and on the other, the assertion of unbridled patient autonomy.
Of course, for advancing the case for physician-assisted suicide and
euthanasia, other arguments exist. There are those appealing to mercy for
relieving pain and to economics for relieving costs, those appealing to
privacy and those to self-determination, a species of autonomy.27 The
sifting and evaluation of these arguments are far from over, their
implications so great that the Supreme Court in its decision of 1997
effectively left the matter of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia to be
thrashed out by the people and their legislatures.28

Physician Involvement
I

r

Of the arguments against physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia,
one stands out with particular relevance for doctors intent on practicing
their profession morally. That argument constructs its case from the simple
premise that physicians ought not kill.
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Of course, this ought emerges from a prior assessment of the nature of
medicine against which the actions of its practitioners are to be measured.
In this regard the venerable Hippocratic Oath has for over two thousand
years been serviceable in defining medicine and proscribing the actions that
violate it. Whether doctors subscribe to the Oath or not, they must at least
wonder why its arcane wisdom singles out on the part of physicians three
behaviors irreconcilable with patient healing: breach of confidentiality,
sexual relations with the patient, and dispensing deadly drugs.
These restrictions are intelligible in terms of that one reality which
29
doctors possess and their patients do not, namely, power.
In the
physician-patient relationship, the power which doctors possess trumps any
assumption of doctor-patient equality and, indeed, patient autonomy itself.
After all, physicians hold the monopoly on medical information relative to
prognosis, treatments, costs and burdens. With their technical expertise,
physicians even layout the therapeutic options from which the
"autonomous patient?' is to choose.
Faced particularly with grave
outcomes, the patient invariably feels daunted by such choices and tends to
become more, not less, dependent on the doctor. How in the interest of
patient autonomy can the influence of doctors be discounted when they are
legally empowered to offer their patient the option of an "electable death?"
Contra Kevorkian, the proscriptions contained in the Hippocratic
Oath are not those of a religious sect but of a profession cognizant of its
power both to heal and to harm. Physicians should not take advantage of
their patient' s vulnerability and naked exposure. For physicians literally
handle and investigate their patient's body and are privy to intimacies that
few others are. Wielding such power, the ancient Pythagorean doctors
merely articulated the norms to which all their colleagues subscribed for
the practice of good medicine.
The ban on killing patients is the first of all the material norms laid
out in the Hippocratic Oath. Couched in the language of a promise, the
norm obligates its adherent in these terms: " I will neither give a deadly
drug to anybody if I am asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this
effect .. . " The logic is unassailable.

'I
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Can wholeness and healing ever be compatible with intentionally
killing the patient? Can one benefit the patient as a whole by making
him dead? ..
To say it plainly, to bring nothingness is incompatible with
serving wholeness: one cannot heal - or comfort - by making nil.
The healer cannot annihilate if he is truly to heal. 30

12
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Medical wisdom reaching back two millennia would have those who
practice healing recognize and hold in check the awesome power they
wield. In treating their patients, physicians abuse that power when they use
it to kill instead of to cure, to "make dead" instead of to make comfortable
in dying.
To the argument that physicians ought not to kill, there is yet another
facet involving power. It is the power synonymous with the inviolability of
the person. Such power translates into the individual ' s right to possess and
control his/her own person. It is, therefore, an affront to the power and
dignity of a person to be possessed by another as in slavery or to be
disposed of as in murder.
The gauge of a civilized society has been the enactment of laws
31
reducing the occasions when the kil1ing of persons is pennitted.
Universally, societies governed by law have already outlawed all fonns of
private killing, irrespective of the motives (e.g., honor or revenge). Going
beyond private killing, western society has traditionally sought to limit
even legally sanctioned killing. Notwithstanding the relatively recent
introduction of abortion, society has sanctioned only three occasions for
killing: self-defense, a just war, and capital punishment. Europe and many
countries have pared back those occasions by eliminating capital
punishment. Thus, exempting abortion, the obvious evolution of society
has been traditionally in the direction of curtailing killing, not increasing it.
How do we account for this restriction?
The most obvious reason is a reluctance to give one person absolute
and irrevocable power over the life of another, whether there is consent
or not. That prohibition is a way of saying that the social stakes in the
legitimization of killing are extraordinarily high .32

In countenancing killing, a society erodes in its members the sense of
personal power and sovereignty. To the degree that society penn its killing,
those attributes appear uncertain and all the more fragile for being
transferred.
~
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To allow another person to kill us is the most radical relinquishment of
sovereignty imaginable, not just one more way of exercising it. Our life
belongs no longer to us, but to the person into whose power we give
it. 33

Seen in this light, Oregon and the Netherlands symbolize an ominous
and aberrant development in western society. Instead of restricting
legalized killing, society is ready to introduce a new category (Editor 's
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note: This address was given in 1999). Where, in the interest of the
common good, society traditionally sanctioned killing the assailant, the
invader and the criminal, now society stands poised to kill the sick.
Notwithstanding its supposed legal restraints, the category represents
a return to private killing justified, as we saw earlier, by arguments
concerning pain and costs, privacy and autonomy. Dispatching the sick - a
very elastic category as Kevorkian has shown - is, indeed, private since it
occurs within the confidential relationship enjoyed by physician and
patient. Herein lies the insidiousness of this category of killing. For the
patient relinquishes the right and power of hislher own inviolability to the
physician who arrogates to himself a lethal power forbidden by the very
nature of medicine. From all indications in the Netherlands, such a deadly
pact is inherently prone to escape legal control and surveillance. 34
In this issue of power and physician-assisted suicide there are many
ramifications which must remain unaddressed as we conclude this paper.
However, one thing should be evident: the spectre of abuse is invariably
present when power and killing come together. Medicine, for the sake of
its own integrity, must stay out of the killing business. Physicians should
seek to eliminate pain and suffering, not the patient.
For those dispensing and for those receiving medical treatment, the
distinctions between killing and letting die and between extraordinary and
ordinary means have been serviceable guideposts. Established by common
sense and not by a surveyor' s level, they mark out for doctors and patients
alike moral perimeters not to be transgressed.
In an age quick to dismantle the traditional taboos against killing, the
move to legitimize physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia has followed
abortion in quick succession. This fast-moving death train expects
physicians to climb on board. But they must resist and shout to their
colleagues already on board, "Physicians ought not kill!"
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